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Open access under CC BYSemmelweis’s work predates the discovery of the power of randomization in medicine by almost a cen-
tury. Although Semmelweis would not have consciously used a randomized controlled trial (RCT), some
features of his material—the allocation of patients to the ﬁrst and second clinics—did involve what was in
fact a randomization, though this was not realised at the time. This article begins by explaining why Sem-
melweis’s methodology, nevertheless, did not amount to the use of a RCT. It then shows why it is descrip-
tively and normatively interesting to compare what he did with the modern approach using RCTs. The
argumentation centres on causal inferences and the contrast between Semmelweis’s causal concept
and that deployed by many advocates of RCTs. It is argued that Semmelweis’s approach has implications
for matters of explanation and medical practice.
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Ignaz Semmelweis (1818–1865) is famous for his enquiries into
the causes of childbed fever. His contribution to the ﬁeld of birthing
sciences has been said to be among ‘the most moving, persuasive,
and revolutionary works in the history of science’ (Codell Carter,
1983, p. ix) and is used as example in leading textbooks in philoso-
phy of science. It will be shown in this article that while Sem-
melweis performed several clinical trials, neither randomization
nor control groups were involved in these. In other words, he did
not perform randomized controlled trials (RCTs). This is interesting
since today RCT is the ‘gold standard’ for judging whether a treat-
ment does more good than harm (Sackett et al., 1996, p. 72). In par-
ticular, few challenge the merits of RCT when it comes tothat ‘this statistically derived know
t, the statistical relevance required
epidemiology testify to this point.
o false-positive conclusions about
of RCT this article criticizes. Second,
generalisations—whether causal or n
ations are matters of external valid
al validity as well.
-NC-ND license. warranting inference to causes.1 Should the traditional assessment
of Semmelweis’s contribution be revised downwards?
As we shall see, Semmelweis’s conception of causation probably
differed from that deployed by many of his contemporaries. It differs
from the concept utilized by students of healthcare today—especially
those advocating randomized trials—as well. His necessitarian causal
ontology makes inference to causes demanding in a way that ensures
that such inferences are not dramatically facilitated byRCT. Supporters
of RCT, on the other hand, sometimes help themselves to a causal
concept which makes inference to local causes, that is, the internal
validity (Campbell, 1957) of causal inferences, a rather trivial matter
as soon as randomization can be implementedwhile at the same time
rendering causal generalisation, that is, the external validity of causal
inferences,2 problematic (cf. Kristiansen and Mooney, 2004, p. 8).ledge . . . has consistently been shown to be unreliable, promoting the patently absurd
in order for something to come out as causal in the RCT may be difﬁcult to meet in
It is explicitly remarked in Sackett et al. (1996) that ‘we should try to avoid the non-
efﬁcacy’. Nevertheless, inference to causes in favourable circumstances is uniquely
note that Cronbach (1982) deﬁnes internal and external validity in a slightly different
ot—may be instances of internally valid inferences. But even on his deﬁnition, causal
ity. While being explicitly directed at Campbell’s conception most conclusions in this
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and Semmelweis’s research illustrates the way in which ontology
typically inﬂuences epistemology and vice versa. It also shows that
just what an RCT uniquely adds depends on logically independent
assumptions concerning the nature of causation, and on whether
internal or external validity is at issue.2. Historical reasons
One obvious reason why Semmelweis’s research does not
live up to the current gold standard is that randomization was
not incorporated in any comparable standard operating in
his own time. Randomized trials clearly did not have the
status in the 1840s they have now. Exactly when randomization
becomes evidentially important we do not know. There are
requirements of randomization in psychic research in the 1890s
(Hacking, 1988).
The popularity of randomization develops from R. A. Fisher’s la-
ter methodology for experiments in agriculture. Success did not
come immediately, as Hacking reminds us:
In 1932, when Fisher had a research student write a disserta-
tion on randomized experimental design (at Rothamstead,
but for a University of London degree), no one was willing to
examine it, even though at the time Britain was still the
leading center of pure and applied statistical theory. (Ibid.,
p. 429)
RCT is said to have found its way into medicine and healthcare via
the work of B. A. Hill (1937) and studies of the efﬁcacy of drugs
(Pedersen, 2004). In light of this historical fact we should not expect
to ﬁnd randomization in Semmelweis’s work (which, to clarify the
timeline, predates the discovery of the power of randomization in
medicine by almost a century).3. An institution of birth and death
A great deal of information about the problem Semmelweis
worked on and the context in which it arose is available. The
General Hospital of Vienna housed an enormous maternity wing,
catering for about 8,000 patients a year, in the mid-nineteenth
century when Semmelweis began his career. No other hospital in
the world had such a high reputation for the teaching of obstetrics
(Loudon, 1992, p. 65). Maternity care was provided in two clinics
from 1833 onwards: the First Maternity Division and the Second
Maternity Division. After 1840 only the First Clinic (as it is
normally called) was used for the instruction of male medical
students; the Second Clinic was reserved for the instruction of
midwives.
Childbed fever haunted the First Clinic. It was called ‘puerperal
fever’ because it often occurred during the puerperium (approxi-
mately six weeks after childbirth) when the womb returns to its
normal shape. Between 1833 and 1840 death rates in the two clinics
were comparable, but in the period 1841–1846 the death rate was
9.92% in the First Clinic and 3.88% in the second (Gillies, 2005,
p. 161). In fact the differencewas evenmore pronounced than these
numbers suggest, since in severe cases of puerperal fever patients
were sometimes removed from the First Clinic and placed in the
general hospital, where they normally died—thereby failing to be
registered in the First Clinic’s mortality statistics (Semmelweis,
1983, pp. 64–65). There is thus a sense in which the Vienna
Maternity Hospital was indeed, as a student of Semmelweis’s once
remarked, ‘truly an institution of death’.33 A comment by one of Semmelweis’s students, quoted from Loudon (1992), p. 68.4. Non-interventionist refutations
Following Hempel (1966), introductions to the philosophy of
science often refer to Semmelweis in connection with his convinc-
ing enquiry into the causes of the higher death rate from childbed
fever in the First Clinic. Although Semmelweis’s work on childbed
fever had forerunners in the investigations conducted by Alexan-
der Gordon (1752–1799) and Oliver Wendell Holmes (1809–
1894), his method, involving hypothesis-testing in clinical trials,
has a special signiﬁcance. He had reason to look for causes inside
the hospital, since maternity hospital closures, though drastic,
were known to be an efﬁcient ways of curtailing outbreaks of
childbed fever:
Hospitals are closed not to force maternity patients to die else-
where, but because of the belief that if patients deliver in the
hospital they are subject to epidemic inﬂuences, whereas if they
deliver elsewhere they will remain healthy. (Semmelweis, 1983,
pp. 66–67)
Semmelweis examined, and swiftly eliminated, some rather obvi-
ous but erroneous causal hypotheses relating to hospital manage-
ment. A few examples: the incidence of childbed fever is raised by
the clinic’s practice of admitting only single women in desperate cir-
cumstances; childbed fever is caused by the poor ventilation; it
spreads through the laundry process (where a clinic’s laundry was
mixed with that of the general hospital); and it results from dietary
mistakes.
Semmelweis’s elimination of these hypotheses ﬁts well with
the hypothetico-deductive method associated with Hempel. What
Hempel does not mention is that randomization was at least
unintentionally in play at this stage in Semmelweis’s enquiry.
Women were admitted to the two clinics on alternate days
(Loudon, 1992, p. 65). Exploiting this mechanism so as to con-
trol for relevant differences among women in the two clinics
strengthens the assumption that the cause of the fever was to
be found in hospital management. It also increases the evidential
value of Semmelweis’s observations that the clinics were venti-
lated in the same way, that the laundry contractor mixed both
the laundry of the ﬁrst and the Second Clinic with that of the
general hospital, and that the food provided was the same in both
clinics. The suggested hypotheses above are incompatible with
these facts.
Does this imply that, implicitly, Semmelweis was conducting
RCTs after all? No: there may have been a control group, and ran-
domization may have operated, in the early phase of his research,
but the most essential component is lacking: the intervention. The
early phase is an intellectual one relying mostly on information
that has been collected before the testing of the hypotheses.5. Two interventionist studies
To make a stronger case for the possibility that important parts
of Semmelweis’s research were in practice conducted in accor-
dance with the guidelines of evidence-based medicine, so that evi-
dence from his enquiries would be not only acceptable but of
highest rank, we need to examine later phases of the enquiry
where Semmelweis put more promising hypotheses to the test.
The studies here are clearly interventionist and, in a broad sense
of the word, ‘experimental’. We shall use two of these intervention
studies for illustrative purposes.
To begin with, then, one of the ﬁrst hypotheses Semmelweis
tested through intervention was based on the following conclusion
of a hospital commission:
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Toward the end of 1846 an opinion prevailed in one commis-
sion that the disease originated from damage to the birth canal
inﬂicted during the examinations that were part of the instruc-
tional process. However, since similar examinations were part
of the instructions of midwives, the increased incidence of dis-
ease in the clinic for physicians was made intelligible by assum-
ing that male students, particularly foreigners, were too rough
in their examinations. As a result of this opinion the number
of students was reduced from forty-two to twenty. Foreigners
were almost entirely excluded, and examinations were reduced
to a minimum. The mortality rate did decline signiﬁcantly in
December 1846, and in January, February, and March of 1847.
But in spite of these measures, ﬁfty-seven patients died in April
and thirty-six more in May. This demonstrated to everyone that
the view was groundless. (Semmelweis, 1983, p. 84)
The hypothesis in the second example involves Semmelweis’s
own invention. Semmelweis developed the hypothesis after learn-
ing that one of his colleagues, Dr Kolletschka, died from a disease
‘identical to that from which so many hundred maternity patients
had also died’ (ibid., 1983, p. 88) and that Kolletschka had received
a puncture wound ‘with the same knife that was being used in the
autopsy’ (ibid., p. 87):
THE CHLORINA LIQUIDA INTERVENTION
Suppose cadaverous particles adhering to hands cause the same
disease among maternity patients that cadaverous particles
adhering to the knife caused in Kolletschka. Then if those parti-
cles are destroyed chemically, so that in examinations patients
are touched by ﬁngers but not by cadaverous particles, the dis-
ease must be reduced. This seemed all the more likely, since I
knew that when decomposing organic material is brought into
contact with living organisms it may bring on decomposition.
To destroy cadaverous matter adhering to hands I used chlorina
liquida. This practice began in the middle of May 1847; I no
longer remember the speciﬁc day. Both the students and I were
required to wash before examinations. After a time I ceased to
use chlorina liquida because of its high price, and I adopted
the less expensive chlorinated lime. In May 1847, during the
second half of which chlorine washings were ﬁrst introduced,
36 patients died—this was 12.24 percent of 294 deliveries. In
the remaining seven months of 1847, the mortality rate was
below that of the patients in the second clinic. In these seven
months, of the 1841 maternity patients cared for, 56
died . . . Since the chlorine washings were instituted with such
dramatic success, not even the smallest additional changes in
the procedures of the ﬁrst clinic were adopted to which the
decline in mortality could be even partially attributed. (Ibid.,
pp. 91–92)
Are these intervention studies perhaps cases of RCT? John
Matthews (2006, p. 3) has claimed that if they were RCT studies,
they would involve (1) a population of eligible patients; (2) a group
of patients recruited from this population; (3) at least two
treatment groups; and (4) randomized allocations of treatment. It
would also be necessary (5) for outcomemeasures in the treatment
groups to be compared at the end of the trial.
It should be conceded at once that there is reference to the Sec-
ond Clinic in themale foreigner and the chlorina liquida intervention
studies. In fact, Lipton (2004, pp. 75–79) defends the view that
Semmelweis attached great importance to comparisons between
First Clinic and Second Clinic. Hence component (3) seems to be
in place in both cases. Equally, the same kind of random allocation
mechanism as before is in place. Loudon (1992, p. 65) claims that
there was a ‘system of random allocation’ in play in Semmelweis’sstudies. Hence conditions (1), (2) and (4) appear to be fulﬁlled.
Finally, there are some post-test comparisons between the ﬁrst
and second clinics, so an element of (5) is present as well.
It is certainly tempting to conclude that the tension between
RCT studies in evidence-based medicine and Semmelweis’s
research, set up in this article, is exaggerated; but this would be
a mistake. The reconciliatory attempt above is driven by superﬁcial
features. It may be true that (1)–(5) can be used to describe
Semmelweis’s two interventions studies, but the description is
only partly accurate as a reconstruction of what was going on.
There are both descriptive and normative reasons for this. To
begin with the descriptive reasons: Semmelweis is more concerned
with comparisons between pre- and post-tests within the First
Clinic than he is with comparison of the ﬁrst and second clinics.
There might be an element of (3) and (5) in what Semmelweis
does, but it does not seem very important to him. Moreover, there
is no evidence that Semmelweis was content with the random
allocation and the way in which the alleged control group was
set up. He does not seem to be in control of the situation. If this
is true, it immediately tells against ascribing the RCT design to
him. Experimental designs in general and RCTs in particular are
often characterised in terms of the investigator’s control, or lack
of control, of the allocation of participants to intervention groups
(cf. Deeks et al., 2003, p. 2). On the basis of the admittedly weak
evidence we have of Semmelweis’s intentions and administrative
authority, it would be hard to come to the decisive conclusion that
any of these interventions were cases of RCT—at least, as we know
it today.
More strikingly, there are normative reasons to doubt that
Semmelweis utilised the Second Clinic in order to perform
intervention studies with a control group. On the assumption that
Semmelweis is right about his hypotheses there are major differ-
ences between the intervention group and the control group before
treatment. In the male foreigner intervention, to begin with, the
supposed control group consists exclusively of midwives who are
supposed to be gentler than staff at the First Clinic. In particular,
it is implicit in the discussion that there were no foreign men
among these midwives. In the chlorina liquida intervention (to
move on to the next case) the cadaveric matter hypothesis postu-
lates a major difference between the groups. According to that
hypothesis, the intervention group inhabits an environment that
supposedly contains much more in the way of causally active
cadaverous particles than the control group does. It is evident that
the two interventions render the two clinics more similar than
they were before the treatment. This makes the two intervention
studies bad examples of RCT. It is hard to believe that
Semmelweis—a hero in the annals of hypothetico-deductive
research—would make such a mistake at all, let alone twice.
It comes as no surprise, then, that in the two intervention stud-
ies performed the effects of the manipulations are measured
against how things were before the intervention took place in
the First Clinic rather than how things were in the Second Clinic.
Not only is randomization absent in Semmelweis’s well known
intervention studies, but the idea of a simultaneous control group
seems to have been of little interest to him as well.6. The ontology and epistemology of causation
Sometimes we mistakenly infer causal relations from real
enough, but misleading correlations. Smoking and lung cancer
are probably related as cause to effect, but there is a small possibil-
ity that both have a common cause. As long as we have suspicions
as to what this common cause might be we can devise comparative
studies to investigate the matter; but often we do not know, have
no idea, what the common cause might be. The popularity of RCT is
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Randomization is a handy tool that helps us to control for unde-
tected common causes—and, in that way, improve on matters of
internal validity.
To be in a position to make valid causal inferences from RCT
outcomes we seem to require extra assumptions. Yet more than
one advocate of randomization adopts a view on which RCT alone
underwrites a positive causal inference. Consider David Papineau
for example:
You take a sample of people with the disease. You divide them
into two groups at random. You give one group the treatment,
withhold it from the other . . . and judge on this basis whether
the probability of recovery in the former group is higher. If it
is, then T [treatment] must now cause R [recovery], for the ran-
domization will have eliminated the danger of any confounding
factors which might be responsible for a spurious correlation.
(Papineau, 1994, p. 439)
This is excessively optimistic for reasons having to do with the pos-
sible artefacts of randomization (cf. Shadish et al., 2002, Ch. 2), but
that is, not the present point. Let us assume that randomization is
successful in the desired respect. Papineau’s modiﬁed position
seems to rely on a concept of causation given which in the relevant
cases causation is entailed by (i.e. is unproblematically inferable
from) the fact that the relative frequency of R in the intervention
group is higher than it is in the control. Thus, for instance, the con-
cept of cause employed is not that causes are sufﬁcient in the cir-
cumstances, nor that they are necessary. This is plainly not so
since neither kind of causation is entailed by the experimental fact.
Let us reserve ‘P-causation’ for the type of causal ontology compat-
ible with Papineau’s general approach.4
Now consider Semmelweis’s intervention studies. They reveal
almost as much about his concept of cause, ‘S-causation’, as the
above quotation reveals about P-causation. First, Semmelweis’s
argument from the mix of laundry from the First Clinic and Second
Clinic, together with the differences in mortality between the two
clinics, to the conclusion that mixing the laundry with laundry
from the general hospital does not cause childbed fever suggests
that he is looking for a cause potent enough to actually result in ef-
fects in the relevant circumstances. In this respect S-causation
resembles P-causation.
But second, and more importantly, the argument from the fact
that hospital closures elsewhere have prevented further outbreaks
of childbed fever to the conclusion that we need to look for causes
in this hospital environment strongly suggests that Semmelweis
conceives of causes as necessary for effects. This suspicion is con-
ﬁrmed by close examination of Semmelweis’s refutation in the
male foreigner intervention. The withdrawal of foreign males is
accompanied by lower mortality rates for several months. Then,
and still within the temporal boundaries of the intervention, mor-
tality increases. Semmelweis’s summary, recall, was straightfor-
ward: ‘This demonstrated to everyone that the view was
groundless’. But unless S-causation is tied to unique causes, Sem-
melweis’s claim is too strong. Perhaps, we might think, another
cause of childbed fever, compensating for the non-occurrence of
X, emerged towards the end of the intervention at T.
The most interesting contrast here is with P-causation. Imagine
that two successfully randomized, controlled trials are run at T and
T respectively. In each case, the intervention consists in random4 We should be careful not to take it for granted that what has been quoted is Papineau’s a
what is detected is an objective probability or even an single-case objective probability. Every
which causal claims can actually be demonstrated in the ideal RCT, by making P-causation
other philosophers of causation express views that are in line with P-causation. For instanc
positive result deductively implies the conclusion under test: If there is a higher probabili
deductively that T causes O in the experimental population under the experimental condiwithdrawal of male foreigners. Let us focus on the ﬁrst trial, where
we assume that there is an increase in relative frequency. In this
case—given what Papineau says—withdrawal is a P-cause of the
effect. This is clearly compatible with there being no increase in
relative frequency in the other trial. This result should, for exam-
ple, be expected if ‘the other cause’ of childbed fever was present
in the intervention and control group in the second trial but not
the ﬁrst.
Looking at matters more generally, we ﬁnd direct indications
that Semmelweis’s concept of causation is linked to that of neces-
sity in his many causal claims. For example: ‘In order for childbed
fever to occur, it is a condition sine qua non that decaying matter is
introduced into the genitals’ (Semmelweis, 1983, p. 149). And, of
course, others have ascribed a necessitarian notion of causation
to Semmelweis:
Semmelweis seems to have been among the ﬁrst to conceive of
puerperal fever in a way such that it would have a necessary
cause—all of his contemporaries seem to have been thinking
in altogether different ways. (Codell Carter, 1983, pp. xlix–l)
In the second half of the nineteenth century . . . it became
increasingly standard to try to characterise a disease in terms
of a single necessary cause . . . Semmelweis was in fact one of
the ﬁrst to adopt this new approach to causality . . . but the very
novelty of the approach must have made it hard for his contem-
poraries to understand and accept. (Gillies, 2005, pp. 175–176)
The reception of Semmelweis’s conclusions, as reported in Codell
Carter’s introduction to Semmelweis’s The etiology, concept, and pro-
phylaxis of childbed fever (1983), displays a preoccupation with the
nature of causation. On the one hand, there are people like
Semmelweis’s inﬂuential friend Josef Skoda. Skoda announces
Semmelweis’s results, but overlooks, or at least downplays, any
notion that he claimed to have found the necessary cause of child-
bed fever. Skoda even denies this ambition in ofﬁcial formulations
such as: ‘[Semmelweis was] not seeking to explain all the causes
of puerperal fever, but only to ﬁnd and to circumvent the causes
of the excessive mortality in the ﬁrst clinic’ (quoted from Codell
Carter, p. xxx n. 156). On the other hand, there are those who
correctly understand Semmelweis’s causal claim but adjudge the
reasons to accept it wanting. For instance, Hermann Lebert, profes-
sor of clinical medicine at Breslau, might have accepted that
Semmelweis discovered one cause of childbed fever, but he was
not at all convinced of its uniqueness, that is, necessity. A number
of victims of childbed fever, Breslau conjectured, had never been
exposed to cadaveric matter:It is questionable whether those who have died of this disease
can have been directly inoculated by poison from corpses.
Semmelweis has elevated this possibility into a system. In any
case this would be only one of many possibilities of conveyance.
(Quoted from ibid., p. xxxiii)
Those who accepted and those who rejected Semmelweis’s conclu-
sions about what it was that caused childbed fever shared a scepti-
cal view of his ontological views on causation.
The implications of this clash between causal ontologies will be
discussed further in the next section. It should be noted that some
of the evidence can reasonably be said only to support the weaker
interpretation that Semmelweis conceived of this speciﬁc cause asctual position. In a few passages he adds the further and complicating constraints that
such addition—especially of the former kind—decreases the internal validity, that is,
more distant from what is manifested in ideal RCTs. It should be noted that several
e, Cartwright (2009), p. 129, states that ‘it is possible to show that in an ‘‘ideal” RCT a
ty of O in the treatment group in an ‘‘ideal” RCT than in the control group, it follows
tions’.
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important in settling the ontological question. His refutations of
alternative hypotheses, more than his presentation of the cadaveric
matter hypothesis, show that Semmelweis was only looking for a
necessary cause. It was no coincidence that the cause he found
was of this kind.
Again, note that these two concepts of causation, P- and S-cau-
sation, are automatically built into neither the single group design
implemented by Semmelweis nor the RCT design advocated by
Papineau. For instance, if the claim of this article—that there is in
fact no role for randomization in Semmelweis’s intervention
studies—is mistaken, he may well be conducting RCTs with a
necessitarian concept of cause. And this would still be helpful in
partly handling ignorance. The reason why Semmelweis chooses
S-causation instead of P-causation is probably connected with
the divergent consequences of P- and S-causation, and especially
with their difference with regard to external validity. Certainly,
when we examine Semmelweis’s reason for rejecting the causal
claim of the commission we ﬁnd that this difference is both visible
and signiﬁcant. But before giving this illustration let us ﬁrst brieﬂy
mention a difference that seems more directly induced both by the
adoption of an RCT-perspective and Semmelweis’s hypothesis-dri-
ven approach.
In Semmelweis’s approach the intervention, as well as the rest
of the experimental situation, typically belongs to the realm of
empirical consequences rather than reﬂecting the causal hypothe-
sis itself. Hence, a theoretical, or ontological, distance between a
relevant cause and what is intervened on and tested in experimen-
tal studies is inevitably assumed in the latter case. This is less inev-
itable with the P-causation approach. On this approach it becomes
natural to identify the alleged cause with the withdrawal of male
foreigners, to be sure. But when describing Semmelweis’s case it
is clearly preferable to identify the alleged cause with that indi-
cated in Semmelweis’s original text when he says that ‘the damage
to the birth canal inﬂicted during the examinations that were part
of the instructional process’.
Back to the reason for refusal: Semmelweis has an ontological
reason to reject the hypothesis and to say that it is groundless that
an advocate of P-causation would not have. A truly necessary cause
cannot be absent while the effect is present. It does not help that
when it is absent at T the effect is absent as well. It must be the
case that when it is absent at T the effect is absent again. S-causes
come with entailments about other situations in a way that
P-causes do not.5 Actually, given what Papineau has told us about
P-causes, the only thing we can do with them is to plead igno-
rant—in neither case has Semmelweis provided us with the kind of
experimental design that allows us to determine inferentially
whether P-causes are present or not.
7. The importance of practice and explanation for ontology
The primary context in which randomization is discussed is
epistemological (Papineau, 1994, is typical in this respect). This
contextual reality emphasizes that the need for randomization is
positively correlated with ignorance about the local case under
scrutiny. It is often in order to control for unknown bias that we
randomize. It drives us towards a concern with matters of internal
validity.
This article has pointed to a different, but complementary,
correlation between randomization and ontology. Sometimes the
belief in the power of experimentation spawns constructive ideas5 Cronbach (1982), pp. 137–138, makes a similar point, but, arguably, he misidentiﬁe
situations in the past. My argument is that some of those pursuing the internal validity issu
formulated as in the quotation from Papineau clearly has this problem, and so has the posit
a single-case probability (cf. n. 4).about causal ontology, like P-causation. Given P-causation, the
perfectly randomized controlled trial validates inferences to
causes. The presumption that a successful RCT proves causation,
and that therefore causation is P-causation, is widespread even
among critics of evidence-based medicine (see e.g. Daly, 2005,
p. 6). Randomization has an ontological, as well as purely episte-
mological, interface.
On the assumption that the combination of RCT and P-causation
resolves the perennial problem of causal inference, and assuming
also that it is a good thing to ﬁnd any treatment that increases
the probability of curing the patient or preventing a disease, should
we not let the ‘gold standard’ of evidence-based medicine guide
our ontology to P-causation?
Not so quickly. The choice of ontology has consequences that
are less straightforwardly epistemological than the above focus
on internal validity suggests. Two of these concern practice and
explanation. The comparison of S- and P-conceptions of childbed
fever in these respects helps us to understand Semmelweis’s strug-
gle, as I shall try to explain in the next two subsections.
7.1. Implications for practice
The ontological conﬂict between Semmelweis and his col-
leagues was at least partly grounded in disagreements over the
way in which diseases should be characterized and deﬁned. It
had been the case that morphological features were decisive. With
such a concept of disease the possibility that each disease has var-
ious unrelated causes is clearly not ruled out. Semmelweis’s work
was partly inspired by another, causal, conception of disease, and
on this conception diseases must have necessary causes—it is
impossible for them not to do so. Semmelweis was not afraid of
the re-categorization that might follow from this. For instance,
the concept of childbed fever might have dissolved completely:
‘Kolletschka also had this disease. Thus childbed fever is not a
species of disease; rather it is a type of pyemia’ (Semmelweis,
1983, p. 117). In other words, the ontological difference between
P- and S-causation and the differing views on how to deﬁne
diseases have obvious corollaries in medical practice.
Medical practice beneﬁts enormously from the discovery of
necessary causes that can be blocked, or annulled, before they
become causally efﬁcacious. But characterizing causes so that each
disease can have various unrelated causes makes it difﬁcult to gen-
erate effective techniques for controlling the disease in some cases.
Physicians have identiﬁed both excessive and inadequate diet as
causes of the same disorder. In such cases it is even possible for
the measures adopted to correct one of these factors to cause the
disorder by bringing about the other factor (Codell Carter, 1983,
p. xxvii). Regardless of how the world really is, the policy of search-
ing only for necessary causes—adopting a causally necessitarian
worldview—to a large extent circumvents this problem in medical
practice.
However, this focus on the virtues of necessity reﬂects directly
only one reason that the choice between P- and S-causation is
important for practice. Of even greater practical importance is the
difference arising for matters of external validity, or causal general-
ization. To recap: the few things we have so far assumed about
P-causation permit us to conclude that proving P-causation has
few implications for external validity. From within the P-causation
framework, questions of internal validity (proving causation) seem
ﬁrmly separated from questions of external validity (justifying cau-
sal generalizations). Indeed, in order to limit misunderstandingss the reason the conclusion holds. He argues that internal validity focuses on local
e adopt a P-causation conception that fails to support these entailments. P-causation
ion reported in Cartwright (2009), and it still exists if what is claimed to be detected is
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posed a new label: ‘local molar causal validity’. The word ‘local’
emphasizes the idea that the validity being claimed is limited to
‘the context of particular treatments, outcomes, times, settings,
and persons studied’ (Shadish et al., 2002, p. 54). That is, randomi-
zation in the sense we are discussing here is not supposed to have
bearing on external validity but is all important so far as local
matters of P-causation are concerned. In this respect, as we have
already remarked, S- and P-causation clearly diverge.
This difference is not dependent on P-causation being non-
necessitarian as such: it is due to it not being as universal. Even
if (in accordance with endnote 2) we grant that, under circum-
stances where local P-causes have been sampled carefully, P-cau-
sation claims statistically generalize to the corresponding
population, nothing whatsoever is entailed about slightly different
circumstances. Plainly this has implications for practice as well.
Lee J. Cronbach has made this point:
I consider it pointless to speak of causes when all that can be
validly meant by reference to a cause in a particular instance
is that, on one trial of a partially speciﬁed manipulation t under
conditions A, B, and C, along with other conditions not named,
phenomenon P was observed. To introduce the word cause
seems pointless. Campbell’s writings make internal validity a
property of trivial, past-tense, and local statements. (Cronbach,
1982, p. 137)
At this stage S-causation (but not P-causation) seems to be best
used for medical decision-making. At least, with P-causation there
is a need for extra assumptions grounding the external validity of
relevant P-causation claims.6
7.2. Implications for explanation
One cannot consider Semmelweis’s research without reﬂecting
on the question why he failed to convince others. The story of
Semmelweis is a tragic one at this personal level. Donald Gillies
(2005) tells a plausible Kuhnian story about dominant paradigms
and the importance of a new hypothesis emerging in revolutionary
times in order to stand the chance of being accepted. According to
him, Semmelweis’s theory clashed with the dominant paradigm.
As we have seen, an obvious problem with S-causation was that
it did not harmonize with entrenched ontological beliefs in
medical science.
Disregarding these entrenched beliefs but keeping Gillies’s idea
about the importance of a theory or paradigm in mind, we might
conjecture that S-causation has explanatory potential that P-causa-
tion lacks. With P-causation it is difﬁcult to generate relevant
explanations for the observed facts.7 The reason is straightforward:
what we nearly always succeed in intervening on in RCT studies are
complex entities rather than any speciﬁc property or variable.
Similarly, the outcome derived from an intervention—or indeed
any causal process—is a complex entity. What we manage to do is
multifaceted, and this creates an inability to distinguish causal from
causally irrelevant relations displayed in the study. The more coarse-
grained and indirect the intervention is, the more difﬁcult it will be
to disentangle the causally relevant and causally irrelevant factors
that are components both of the intervention and the observed
outcome. But disentanglement is needed if we are to explain why6 That this need is not easily met can be seen when we contemplate another common cr
For instance, it has been argued by Feinstein & Horwitz (1997), p. 529, that such general
randomized patient’.
7 Codell Carter (1983), p. 27, makes almost the same claim, but he mistakenly attributes t
can still be combined with a concept of causation of Semmelweis’s kind, and then the dif
causation is also possible—although, arguably, it yields similar problems for explanation.something happened (cf. Persson & Sahlin, 2009). As has been shown
in the literature on scientiﬁc explanation, irrelevant information efﬁ-
ciently destroys explanatory power: that water dissolves salt may be
a satisfactory, although shallow, explanation of the fact that a piece
of salt ‘disappeared’ when put in water. However, add the informa-
tion that the water was holy and the explanation vanishes into thin
air—similarly, of course, with other interventions containing a blend
of relevant and irrelevant explanatory features. In sum, there are a
number of interesting reasons not to take the modern stand-point
with regard to intervention studies and causal ontology for granted.
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